
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
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT

: Transfer of Top Secret Control Function

to the Office of Security

- 1. This memorandum suggests <u>action</u> on your part; such action is contained in paragraph 12.
- 2. Reference is made to the decision of the Executive Director-Comptroller at the Deputies Meeting on 2 June 1972 to transfer the Agency Top Secret control function from the Central Reference Service (CRS) to the Office of Security.
- 3. Discussions with the current Agency Top Secret Control Officer in CRS have reflected that his duties include the dissemination within the Agency of a large percentage of noncompartmented documents received from other agencies as well as the administration of the Top Secret control responsibilities for the Agency. The Office of Security is assuming only the latter function, viz., the management of a Top Secret Control Program for CIA.
- 4. The CRS Top Secret Control Officer has operated in large measure in a limited fashion, for the most part restricting his actual duties to the preparation of administrative guidance, the dispensing of Top Secret Control Numbers and the maintenance of up-to-date listings of Area Top Secret Control Officers. Current Agency regulations do not require an Agency-wide inventory of Top Secret documents. Therefore, no centralized system of Top Secret document inventory exists.



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- 5. The spirit of the new Executive Order 11652 and its implementing National Security Council Directive suggest not only the assignment of Top Secret classification to fewer documents but also the implementation of a high degree of protection to those documents warranting this classification. Also the Executive Director-Comptroller has expressed a desire to simplify control procedures for those documents requiring controls. The procedures are being structured to simplify extant controls and at the same time more realistically provide a high degree of protection to those documents.
- 6. The management of the Agency collateral Top Secret Control Program as well as the heretofore CRS control function over COSMIC, CENTO, and SEATO Top Secret documents are being assigned to the Physical Security Division where the Office of Security is focusing all its security functions pertaining to information handling, including computer security. The actual dissemination of these documents remains the function of CRS.
- 7. The Office of Security has completed a preliminary analysis of the Top Secret Control responsibility and has identified four functional areas for its program:
- a. Policy Guidance: As evidenced by the proposed uniform procedures for security control of Top Secret material, Executive Order 11652 (along with its implementing National Security Council Directive, the revised Agency Headquarters Regulation and other pertinent policy promulgations) has demonstrated a need for updating policy guidance to Agency components in the handling of Top Secret documents. In addition to the routine provision of advice to Agency components that has been required in the past, the substantive changes of new information control policies will fuel a number of requests for help in interpreting such policy in the Top Secret area. In this connection, the Office of Security believes that procedures involved in Top Secret control, whether traditional or newly established, need constant review especially over the near term to determine their practicality and adequacy.

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- b. <u>Inspections</u>: The Office of Security believes that periodic inspections of Top Secret control areas and procedures, and spot inventories are an essential element in an effective Top Secret Control Program.
- c. Lost Documents: The Office of Security has traditionally had responsibility for investigating the loss of Agency documents including those classified Top Secret; this responsibility will be continued under this functional reassignment. It is hoped that direct responsibility for the Top Secret Control Program may permit the Office of Security to become involved in the loss or misplacement of Top Secret documents in more timely fashion to permit such investigative efforts to be more effective. It is also hoped that centralization may allow these investigations to be less retributive and more remedial.
- d. Control Systems Support: In addition to maintaining the current or perhaps an improved system of assigning Top Secret Control Numbers and maintaining the Area Top Secret Control Officer mechanism, the Office of Security sees an explicit need for the establishment of a centrally managed Top Secret Inventory System. A centralized computer based method for inventory maintenance on Top Secret documents is a design goal.
- 8. Implementation of this program outlined above will require the assignment of additional positions to the Physical Security Division. At the present time, the limited CRS Top Secret control program is managed by a GS-14 Intelligence Directorate careerist; the administrative support functions related to this function are carried out by a GS-07 Information Control Assistant and a GS-06 Information Control Assistant.
- 9. The proposed Office of Security Top Secret Control Program, summarized above in paragraph 7, envisions functions and responsibilities beyond those heretofore pursued by CRS. Such a program dictates allocation to this effort of positions at least comparable to those currently assigned to the CRS program.

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- 10. The policy implications of a Top Secret program and the need for professionalism in conducting an inspection activity confirm the justification for assigning overall management responsibility of the proposed program to an experienced Security Officer at the GS-14 level. The related administrative activities can be adequately handled by the assignment of a GS-07 Administrative Assistant and a GS-05 Clerk Stenographer.
- 11. Discussions with the Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence have reflected that despite the reassignment of this responsibility from CRS, the Intelligence Directorate cannot provide any positions to the Office of Security. The Office of Security itself has reviewed its current table of organization and has determined it cannot totally absorb the Top Secret control functions without curtailing other essential security efforts. Existing personnel strength can be used for investigative activities incident to lost documents, for Top Secret policy guidance efforts, and for a portion of computer system design efforts. Further, the administrative support requirements for the program can be satisfied with some difficulty by the realignment of clerical positions within the Office.
- 12. The current Office of Security table of organization, however, cannot be adjusted to provide a position for the GS-14 level Security Officer required for the overall program management responsibility. It is requested, therefore, that such a position at the GS-14 level with appropriate ceiling adjustment be transferred to the Office of Security for this purpose.

Howard J. Usborn
Director of Security

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SUBJECT: Transfer of Top Secret Control Function to the Office of Security

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SUBJECT: Transfer of Top Secret Control Function to the Office of Security

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